The study examines the impact of ownership structure on exchange rate exposure using a sample of 651 Indian firms over the period 2001 to 2013. The study finds that ownership structure, in which agency costs and monitoring problems are lower, is associated with a reduced level of exchange rate exposure. The evidence also reveals that currency derivative usage is associated with greater reduction in exchange rate exposure for firms that have lower agency and monitoring problems obtained from their ownership structure. This study has important implications for managers, shareholders and investors who are associated with assessing a firm's exposure to exchange rate risk.
developed; therefore, governance of listed corporations takes place mainly through internal mechanisms (Douma et al., 2006) . Ownership structures play a central role in determining the extent to which the interests of owners and managers are aligned (Dalton et al., 2007) . Specifically, in emerging markets such as India, the enforcement of shareholders' rights, as reflected in the efficiency of the judicial system and the rule of law, is somewhat weaker, and ownership concentration becomes a substitute for legal investor protection (La Porta et al., 1998) . Therefore, as an internal governance mechanism, ownership structure should have a significant impact on a firm's exchange rate exposure.
However, there has been very limited research on this issue. Only one study, by Hutson and Stevenson (2010) , addresses the relationship between country-specific corporate governance environment -i.e., strong creditor and shareholders rights -and exchange rate exposure. Their study finds that the country-specific corporate governance environment, which provides high protection to creditors, is associated with reduced exchange rate exposure. The potential relationship between ownership structure (as a firm-level internal governance mechanism) and exchange rate exposure has not received attention in the prior literature, and hence is investigated in this paper.
This paper provides the following contributions to the existing literature. Firstly, to the best of our knowledge, no study has yet provided evidence that ownership structure, in which the agency costs and monitoring problems are lower, is associated with a reduced level of exchange rate exposure. Secondly, this study examines the conditional impact of currency derivative usage on exchange exposure under different ownership structures, which has not been investigated before. This study has important implications for managers, shareholders and other investors who are associated with assessing a firm's exposure to exchange rate risk.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. The theoretical background and review of the empirical literature are presented in the subsequent section, and this is followed by a description of the methodology used in this study for measuring exchange rate exposure and ownership structure variables. The data and summary statistics are then described, followed by the empirical results. Finally, robustness tests are explained and a conclusion outlined.
Literature review and hypotheses

Theory and empirical evidence
The sensitivity of firms' cash flows and market value to fluctuations in exchange rates is known as exchange rate exposure (Hekman, 1985) . The empirical literature finds a weak relationship between exchange rate changes and firm value, which has stimulated substantial research on the issue. One of the explanations for these puzzling findings is that firms reduce their exposure to exchange rate risk via hedging activities. A large part of the empirical literature focuses on the impact of firms' hedging activities on exchange exposure. The extant empirical literature uses derivatives as a proxy for corporate hedging activities and has consensus on the negative relationship between exchange exposure and hedging (Allayannis and Ofek, 2001 ). However, motives behind the hedging activities of managers are influenced by the agency conflicts associated with equity.
The theoretical literature that explains the real motives of hedging can be classified into two main groups. The first suggests that hedging creates value and reduces risk optimally if it mitigates the costs associated with market imperfections such as underinvestment, external financing, financial distress and taxes. Corporate hedging could mitigate underinvestment costs by reducing the volatility of firm value (Myers, 1977) . Hedging decreases the sensitivity of debt claim value to incremental investment and allows shareholders to capture a significant part of the incremental benefit from new investment (Bessembinder, 1991) . In this way, it reduces the incentive for firms to under-invest. Hedging can also reduce the cost of external financing by lowering the cash flow volatility so the firm can have access to internal funds for investment (Froot et al., 1993) . In addition, hedging lowers the probability of financial distress by reducing the volatility of firm value, which reduces the cost of financial distress (Smith and Stulz, 1985) . Corporate hedging stabilises taxable income, as savings from higher income states exceed additional taxes from lower-income states, thereby lowering the average corporate tax burden (Smith and Stulz, 1985) . These shareholder value theories assume that there are no agency costs associated with equity.
The second group of theories indicates that in the presence of agency costs, there are managerial reasons for hedging related to contractual factors that induce managers to undertake non-value-maximising hedging and suboptimal risk reduction. These reasons are selective hedging/speculation, manager's lack of portfolio diversification and the reduction of informational asymmetry among outside investors, BODs and managers about their performance. Selective hedging strategies -a term given by Stulz (1996) -are based on forecasts of exchange rates in which managers attempt to time the market and hedge only a small part of the exposure. This strategy involves the speculative element and increases cash flow volatility; therefore, it does not add value to the firm (Brown et al., 2006) . Managerial risk-aversion motives may lead managers to hedge to protect themselves, and not necessarily to benefit shareholders (Smith and Stulz, 1985) . In addition, hedging can reduce the 'noise' in earnings contributed by macroeconomic factors and lessen the asymmetric information in the market on managerial ability and firm value (Breeden and Viswanathan, 1998; Dadalt et al., 2002) . This indicates that managers with inferior abilities may have incentives not to hedge properly. Therefore, in the presence of agency conflicts, the managerial reasons for hedging activities subsume other incentives and hedging does not create value by reducing the risk suboptimally. Empirical studies also suggest that in the presence of agency conflicts, firm managers may selectively use derivatives for speculation and self-interest (Bodnar et al., 1995; Geczy et al., 2007) .
The corporate governance environment of the firm plays a central role in determining the extent to which the interests of owners and managers are aligned. At the firm level, a strong corporate governance environment reduces managerial agency conflicts and better aligns the interests of managers with those of shareholders. In addition, higher monitoring of managerial activities restricts managers from incorporating their subjective views and benefits into the firm's risk-management policies. This, in turn, induces managers to conduct value-enhancing hedging activities and to manage risk optimally.
Recent empirical studies also reveal that strongly governed firms are more likely to use currency derivatives in shareholders' interests (Lel, 2012) and weakly governed firms usually speculate or take a view with derivatives (Rossi, 2013) . Allayannis et al. (2012) find that hedging adds more value to firms that have strong internal-and externalgovernance environments. Fauver and Naranjo (2010) also find that firms with greater agency and monitoring problems exhibit a negative association between firm value and derivative usage.
The implication of the abovementioned theoretical and empirical literature is that managers may undertake suboptimal and non-value-enhancing hedging activities in the presence of greater agency problems, and expose firms to a higher exchange rate risk. Ownership structure is one of the internal governance mechanisms that determine the extent to which the interests of owners and managers are aligned. Therefore, we hypothesise that ownership structure, in which agency costs and monitoring problems are lower, is associated with a reduced level of exchange rate exposure. The influence of ownership structure on exchange rate exposure has not received attention in the prior literature, and is hence investigated in this paper.
Development of hypotheses
Several ownership structure variables are considered to test the hypothesis that ownership structure, in which agency costs and monitoring problems are lower, is associated with a reduced level of exchange rate exposure.
Several studies argue that concentrated outside owners have greater incentives to actively and effectively monitor deviant managers because of their substantial investment in the firm, and because they have enough voting rights to maintain control and informational advantage, even when there may not be enough legal protection (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) . Even if owners are part of a company's management, high ownership concentration is associated with higher firm value because of the negligent principalagency problem (Schulze et al., 2001) . Higher ownership concentration is associated with lower agency conflicts or higher monitoring of managerial activities. This causes managers to conduct value-enhancing activities and thus leads to lower exchange exposure. Therefore, we hypothesise a negative relationship between ownership concentration and currency exposure.
Different categories of concentrated owners may have different preferences and priorities with respect to corporate risk, stability, growth and performance, and have different incentives to expend resources on monitoring, which determine their relative power and ability to monitor managers (Douma et al., 2006; Gedajlovic et al., 2005) . Thus, in developing further hypotheses, the ownership of several distinct types of owners, such as promoters, institutions and dispersed ownership by individuals, is used.
Specifically, founding family and promoter control is predominant in Indian firms (Khanna and Palepu, 2000) . Thus, in the Indian context, promoter share reflects a direct insider or family holding in the firm (Pant and Pattanayak, 2007) . When a promoter does not take part in the company's management, a positive association between promoter ownership and firm value can be theorised owing to significant monitoring benefits. In this case, founding families have both the incentives and the means to effectively monitor the management team and influence managerial decisions because of their large, undiversified equity position, control, historical long presence, close link between their family wealth and firm welfare, long-term orientation and inside knowledge of the firm's business activities (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) . The higher promoter ownership provides tighter monitoring of managers, which induces managers to undertake value-enhancing hedging, leading to lower exposure.
When founders actively take part in the management, monitoring is not needed. However, according to Jensen and Meckling's (1976) convergence-of-interest hypothesis, as insider (manager/promoter) equity ownership increases, the conflicts between managers and shareholders are likely to be reduced, causing conflicts of interests to converge. The reduced agency costs resulting from the natural alignment of ownermanagers' interests on growth opportunities and risk encourage them to conduct valueenhancing activities (Audretsch et al., 2013) . Therefore, in this case, also, higher promoter ownership reduces the agency costs related to the manager-shareholder conflict, which encourages firms to conduct value-adding hedging. As a result, firms face lower exposure. Overall, we hypothesise that firms with higher promoter ownership should face lower exchange rate exposure. Chibber and Majumdar (1999) argue that for a foreign firm with majority ownership, the agency costs are lowered by efficient monitoring. This is possible because when control of ownership is in the hands of a foreign corporate owner, managers in domestic subsidiaries no longer have an informational advantage. In addition, the shareholdings of firms with foreign direct investment are larger and less fragmented than the shareholdings of foreign institutional investors, which incentivises these shareholders to perform an effective monitoring role (Douma et al., 2006) . This indicates that firms with larger ownership by a foreign promoter are more likely to have well-monitored managers who perform in the best interest of shareholders and who may undertake value-adding hedging activities. Therefore, we postulate a negative relationship between foreign promoter ownership and currency exposure.
Similarly, foreign institutional investors are expected to exert efficient monitoring over managers, which may persuade them to conduct value-enhancing hedging. Thus, higher foreign institutional ownership should be associated with lower exchange exposure. Khanna and Palepu (2000) argue that foreign institutional investment is associated with significant monitoring benefits because existing investors lack both skills and adequate incentives, which leads to higher firm value. Domestic institutional investors have strong incentives to incur the cost of monitoring firms because they often hold substantial ownership blocks in firms (Kim and Lee, 2008) and they cannot always sell the shares of underperforming firms due to potential adverse price effects and indexing (Gillan and Starks, 2000) . This indicates that in the presence of large domestic financial institutions, managers are not able to pursue non-valuemaximising activities due to strict monitoring. Therefore, we expect a negative relationship between shareholding of domestic financial institutions and exchange rate exposure.
Conversely, dispersed ownership is hypothesised to have a positive relationship with exchange rate exposure. The rationale is that dispersed-outside individual shareholders are not able to effectively monitor managers because of the higher coordination costs and information asymmetry problems (Grossman and Hart, 1980) . Additionally, individual shareholdings are too small to influence management decisions, even if the benefits are great enough to provide adequate incentives to become informed (Zeckhauser and Pound, 1990) . In the absence of proper monitoring, managers may pursue non-value-maximising hedging activities that are not beneficial to shareholders.
Finally, we develop an aggregate ownership index in the spirit of Schmidt (2008) and Fauver and Naranjo (2010) to capture overall ownership structure of the firm and test its influence on exchange rate exposure. Both Schmidt and Fauver and Naranjo use a standard approach in the literature, whereby the index gives an equal weight to each of the inputs in it (Allayannis et al., 2012; La Porta et al., 1998; Lel, 2012) . The ownership index includes six variables: ownership concentration, promoter ownership, foreign promoter ownership, foreign institutional ownership, domestic institutional ownership and dispersed ownership.
Each of the index input variables along with their predicted signs on agency costs and monitoring problems are shown in Table 1 .
Except for dispersed ownership, each variable within the index takes a value of one if the variable's respective value is above its industry median, and zero otherwise. For dispersed ownership, the value is one if the respective value of each of the variables is below its industry median, and zero otherwise. High shareholding of individuals is associated with a higher agency and monitoring problems. The index ranges from 0 to 6, with higher index values implying lower agency and monitoring problems. A higher value on the ownership index indicates lower agency costs and monitoring problems, which encourage managers to conduct value-enhancing hedging activities and to manage the risk optimally. Therefore, we hypothesise that firms with higher value of ownership index should have lower exchange rate exposure. 
Methodology
Measuring foreign exchange exposure
To ensure the results are comparable with those of prior studies, exchange rate exposure is estimated using the approach suggested by Jorion (1990), 2 as follows.
where R it is the monthly stock return of firm i in period t; R mt is the monthly return on the market portfolio in period t; R st is the monthly percentage change in the tradeweighted exchange rate index, measured as units of foreign currency per one Indian rupee in period t. 3 An increase in the value of R st indicates an appreciation of the Indian rupee against a basket of foreign currencies. The coefficients β mi and β si represent a measure of the sensitivity of stock return for the firm, i, to market risk and exchange risk; and ε it is the disturbance term. The value obtained for β si for different firms can be interpreted as a level of exposure to exchange rates, indicating the extent to which the stock return responds to a 1% change in the exchange rate. 4 A positive coefficient means that the firm's stock return increases when the Indian rupee appreciates against the basket of other currencies. Equation (1) is estimated using ordinary least square (OLS), correcting for standard errors using the Newey and West (1987) method. The estimation through OLS and using adjusted robust errors are cited as common practice in finance studies for time-series models (Chow et al., 1997; Petersen, 2009 ).
Cross-sectional regression model
The study uses a cross-sectional regression model to examine the impact of ownership structure on exchange rate exposure by controlling for individual firm characteristics known to affect firms' exposure to exchange rate risk. A firm with greater foreign involvement is expected to be exposed to greater currency risk, before any hedging activities are taken into account. Several studies have found a strong positive relationship between a firm's foreign exchange exposure and its foreign involvement (Choi and Prasad, 1995; Dominguez and Tesar, 2006; He and Ng, 1998; Jorion, 1990) . This study also follows prior studies and uses export sales, scaled by total assets, to represent the firm's foreign involvement. A firm may reduce its exchange rate exposure by engaging in financial hedging. To measure financial hedging, a foreign currency derivative usage dummy is used that assigns a value of one if the firm uses foreign currency derivatives, and zero otherwise. This data was hand-collected from the firms' annual reports. To control for possible firm size effects on exchange rate exposure, the natural logarithm of a firm's total assets is used. It is well established in the literature that small firms tend to be more exposed to exchange rate risk than large firms are (Bodnar and Wong, 2003; Chow et al., 1997; Dominguez and Tesar, 2006) . Larger firms are more likely to hedge exchange exposure as a result of their economies of scale; therefore, these firms face lower exposure. Several studies have found that industries are affected differentially by exchange rate movements. Industries differ in terms of pass-through and mark-ups or competitive structure (Marston, 2001 ); hence, they may face different levels of exposure. The industry categories for this study follow the industrial categorisation codes of national industrial classification (NIC). In all specifications of cross-sectional regressions, industry effect is controlled using dummies.
The following cross-sectional regression model is estimated by correcting standard errors for heteroscedasticity using the White (1980) 
where |β si | is the absolute value of foreign exchange rate exposure coefficient of firm i estimated from equation (1) . Taking the absolute value of exposure beta is consistent with the prior literature (Aggarwal and Harper, 2010; Aysun and Guldi, 2011; Choi and Prasad, 1995 Data for currency derivative usage is hand-collected from the annual reports of firms.
OS i denotes various ownership structure variables measuring the agency costs and monitoring of managerial activities for firm i. The six ownership structure variables applied in this study are summarised as follows. The first measure, LARGE, denotes the shareholding by the largest shareholder in the firm. 5 The largest shareholding reflects the degree of ownership concentration in the firm. If the objective is to measure the monitoring effects of ownership concentration, one could use the measures that emphasise the largest owner (Overland et al., 2012) . A second measure, PROMOTER, is the shareholding by a promoter or promoter group in the firm. Following the existing literature on Indian firms (Jackling and Johl, 2009 ), promoter shareholding is considered family ownership in the firm. The third measure, FOREIGN, is the shareholding by a foreign promoter in the firm. Similarly, FII and DFI denote the shareholding by foreign and domestic institutional investors, respectively. DFI is the total shareholding by non-promoter mutual funds/Unit Trust of India (UTI), banks, financial institutions and insurance companies. INDIVIDUAL is the shareholding by non-promoter individuals and represents the dispersed ownership in the firm. Lastly, INDEX is the ownership index constructed from the aforementioned six variables, and denotes the overall aggregate measure of ownership structure.
Sample selection and descriptive statistics
The sample of firms for this study is primarily sourced from the Centre for Monitoring the Indian Economy (CMIE) Prowess database. Similar to previous studies, we exclude financial firms from the sample because derivative usage for financial firms is often business related. The non-financial firms listed on Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) total 4308. The non-financial listed firms that report international transactions (exports or imports) in each year of the sample period equate to 1255, out of which 651 firms have no missing stock return data. Therefore, the final sample consists of 651 firms. In India, listed firms have to make mandatory disclosures about their ownership structure under Clause 35 of the equity listing agreement. These ownership disclosure requirements underwent important changes effective from March 2001. In light of this, the sample period in this study is from April 2001 to March 2013.
Under clause 35 of the equity listing agreement, the shareholding pattern is indicated under three categories, viz., "shares held by promoter and promoter group", "shares held by public" and "shares held by custodians and against which Depository Receipts have been issued." The clause requires firms to report shareholding of promoter and promoter group following the definition under Explanations I, II and III to sub-clause (m) of clause 6.8.3.2 of the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) Disclosure and Investor Protection Guidelines, 2000. The promoter may be an individual, group of individuals, a family or a company who are in overall control of the company, are instrumental in the formulation of a plan and named in the prospectus as promoters. A promoter group includes a promoter and an immediate relative of the promoter. Promoter and promoter group is further classified under Indian and Foreign promoters. The disclosure under Public shareholding is ownership by non-promoters which includes institutional nonpromoters and non-institutional non-promoters. Holdings by financial institutions, commercial banks, insurance companies, mutual funds, foreign institutional investors, venture capital funds, foreign venture capital investors, central and state governments and others, fall under institutional public shareholdings. Under non-institutional public shareholdings are corporate bodies, individuals and others.
To estimate firms' exposure coefficients at the first stage, monthly data is obtained. The market portfolio monthly returns are calculated from the BSE Sensitive Index (Sensex) of 30 firms. The index value is available on the website of the BSE. The nominal effective exchange rate indexes of 36 countries (36 NEER; Base: 1985 = 100) published in the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) monthly bulletin are used for the purpose of calculating monthly exchange rate changes. Examining exposure to the trade-weighted exchange rate index is a standard practice used in prior literature (Bodnar and Gentry, 1993; Choi and Prasad, 1995; Dominguez and Tesar, 2006) . The monthly stock returns 6 of firms, data for ownership structure and control variables are obtained from the CMIE Prowess database. The data for currency derivative usage is obtained from the notes on financial statements within each firm's annual report. Table 2 presents the summary statistics for ownership and control variables. It is evident that high ownership concentration, indicated by the mean value of LARGE (0.51), has evolved in response to the weak legal external environment in India, which is consistent with the findings of La Porta et al. (1998) . Among other variables, the mean value of PROMOTER is 0.53 (0.52), which indicates that promoters and their families are the majority owners in Indian firms; this is consistent with La Porta et al. (2002) . The low mean value (0.12) of FOREIGN indicates that most of these promoters are Indian. The mean shareholding by domestic shareholders, DFI (0.07), is higher than the foreign institutional investor's shareholding, FII (0.04), which is consistent with Khanna and Palepu (2000) . The mean value of INDIVIDUAL is 0.25, indicating that dispersed outside individuals also have substantial ownership in Indian firms. This suggests that India is by and large a hybrid of the 'outsider market-based systems' of the USA and UK and the "insider bank-based systems" of Europe and Japan Sarkar, 2000, 2008) . Approximately 51% of sample firms report that they use currency derivatives to hedge their foreign exchange exposure. Table 3 reports a summary of the exposure estimates from regression equation (1). We can see that significant exposure to exchange rate risk is exhibited by approximately 72% (465/651) of the sample firms. 7 The average value of exchange rate exposure coefficients is 1.645, indicating that a 1% appreciation of the Indian rupee causes an almost 1.64% gain in the firms' stock returns. These results are similar to those of previous studies on emerging markets that report more than half of their sample firms as having significant exposure (Bacha et al., 2013; Kiymaz, 2003; Parsley and Popper, 2006; Tsai et al., 2014; Ye et al., 2014) . This study follows prior studies to include both significant and insignificant exposure coefficients in the cross-sectional regression analysis Chang et al., 2013; Hutson and Stevenson, 2010 ).
8 Table 3 Summary of exchange rate exposure coefficients
No. of firms with significant exposure 465 % of sample firms with significant exposure 72%
No. of firms with positive significant exposure (10% level) 465
No. of firms with negative significant exposure (10% level) 0 Table 4 presents a comparison of exchange rate exposure for firms with different ownership structures. The sample firms are split into two groups based on the median value of ownership variables. Those firms with ownership variables below or equal to the median are assigned to M1, while those with measures above the median are assigned to M2; thus, firms are considered to have lower agency problems as we move from portfolio M1 to portfolio M2. The results provided in Table 4 show that the variations of exchange rate exposure in relation to the ownership structure provide general support for the hypothesis. Taking the example of the overall ownership structure index, INDEX, those firms with higher values of this index, i.e., with lower agency and monitoring problems (M2) have lower average exposure to exchange rate risk (1.541), while those with lower values of index (M1) have higher exposure (1.756); this difference is significant at the 0.01 level. The results for the other ownership variables indicate a similar pattern. Those firms with higher shareholding by foreign promoters, foreign institutional investors, domestic institutional investors and lower dispersed ownership have lower exchange rate exposure. Table 4 also reports a comparison of exchange rate exposure coefficients for currency derivative users and non-users. On average, a 1% change in the Indian rupee is accompanied by a 1.601% change in stock returns for currency derivative users, whereas it is accompanied by a 1.770% change in stock returns for non-users. This variation is consistent with the hypothesis and has statistical significance. Those firms with ownership variables below or equal to median are assigned to M1, while those with above median are assigned to M2.
Empirical results and discussion
Univariate analysis
We also find the pairwise correlations of the variables in the sample (results are not tabulated in the paper owing to limited space). The exchange rate exposure coefficients and HEDGE are significantly negatively correlated, which is consistent with the extant literature. As hypothesised, all ownership variables have significant expected correlations with exchange rate exposure. Table 5 summarises the effects of ownership structure variables on the exchange rate exposure of firms, controlling for differences in firm characteristics. The results (model 1) show that firms using currency derivatives (HEDGE = 1) exhibit significantly lower exchange rate exposure at an amount of 0.16, compared with the non-users of currency derivatives. This finding confirms the results of prior studies on the use of currency derivatives (Allayannis and Ofek, 2001) . Particularly, the second model specification finds that higher concentrated ownership, measured by shareholding of the largest shareholder (LARGE), is associated with lower exchange rate exposure, though it is not significantly different from zero. The third specification (3), which shows a negative association between promoter ownership and exchange rate exposure, is not significant. Specifications (4), (5) and (6) support the hypothesis that higher monitoring of managers, as measured by the shareholding of foreign promoters and foreign and domestic institutional investors, has a significant negative effect on exchange rate exposure. Specification (7) reveals that a dispersed ownership structure, in which managers are not properly monitored, is associated with a significantly higher exchange rate exposure. Specification (8), which includes all variables together, reveals that all the variables significantly reduce exchange rate exposure, implying that each measure is significantly influential to exposure and that none of the variables can be subsumed by others. Finally, in the last specifications (9) and (10), which include the aggregate index, the findings reveal that ownership structure in terms of lower agency costs and monitoring problems is associated with lower exchange rate exposure. The standardised coefficients for specification (10) (not tabulated) are calculated to determine the economic impact of this result. Specifically, these calculations reveal that a one-standarddeviation change in the ownership index decreases firms' exchange rate exposure by 0.152 standard deviations. This implies that holding other factors equal, a firm that has a higher ownership index (lower agency costs and monitoring problems) by one standard deviation would have a lower exposure by about 0.143 standard deviations. This represents the equivalent of a decrease of roughly 8.7% from the average value (9.7% from the median value) of exchange rate exposure. Therefore, these results suggest that ownership structure is effectively able to reduce firms' exposure to exchange rate risk. The findings complement the work of Hutson and Stevenson (2010) , which finds that strong country-level governance mechanisms reduce exchange exposure of firms. In terms of control variables, it is evident from Table 5 that firm size generally has a significant negative effect on exchange rate exposure. The usage of currency derivatives is significantly negatively related to exchange rate exposure, and this relationship is robust across each specification. The effect of export ratio on exchange rate exposure is negative and insignificant across all specifications. The explanation for this finding may be that firms with higher export sales hedge more, and therefore have insignificantly lower exposure.
Multivariate analysis
Ownership structure and effectiveness of currency derivative usage
In this section, the relationship between currency derivative usage and exchange rate exposure under different ownership structures is examined. If hedging is the potential channel through which ownership structure affects exchange exposure, the risk-reduction benefits of currency derivatives usage should be higher for firms with lower agency and monitoring problems. The use of currency derivatives should be associated with greater reduction in exchange exposure for such firms. Table 6 presents the results of the impact of derivatives on exchange exposure for the sub-samples, with high and low ownership indexes, respectively. Consistent with the hypothesis, the results show that firms with a high ownership index (lower agency and monitoring problems) have a negative and significant association between currency derivative use and exchange exposure (coefficient of -0.161), whereas a firm's use of currency derivatives while having a low ownership index (higher agency problems) is not significantly associated with the firm's exposure to exchange rate risk. Table 5 The impact of ownership structure on exchange rate exposure (dependent variable: |β si |) White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are used. Numbers in the parentheses under the coefficients are the associated t-statistics. ***, **, * and ^ indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, 10% and 15% respectively (one-tailed).
Robustness tests
Analysis using financial statement variables as hedging proxies
Optimum hedging theories postulate that firms hedge to mitigate the costs associated with market imperfections such as underinvestment (Bessembinder, 1991) , external financing (Froot et al., 1993) , financial distress and taxes (Smith and Stulz, 1985) . Rather than using a direct measure of hedging, several studies have used indirect measures by choosing financial statement variables that are hypothesised to explain hedging, and consistent with the optimal theory of hedging. To test the robustness of the results, three financial variables are used as hedging proxies, consistent with He and Ng (1998) ; these are book-to-market ratio (BM), dividend-payout ratio (DIV_PAY) and debt-to-equity ratio (DE) . Hedging lowers the probability of financial distress by reducing the volatility of firm value, thereby reducing the cost of financial distress (Smith and Stulz, 1985) . Therefore, we expect that highly levered firms are more involved in hedging, and hence are less exposed to the exchange rate risk. Debt-to-equity ratio is employed as a measure of leverage. The firms with lower liquidity also have a high probability of financial distress and default; thus, they are expected to hedge more and face less exposure. To measure liquidity, a dividend-payout ratio is used in this study and expected to have a positive relationship with exposure. Firms with high levels of growth opportunities face underinvestment problems, and therefore have more incentives to hedge (Froot et al., 1993) . Book-to-market value is used to measure firms' growth opportunities, and is expected to have a positive sign. Table 7 displays the results from the re-estimation of equation (2), taking aforementioned variables as hedging proxies. Similar to previous results, INDEX is negatively signed and strongly significant. The relationship of other ownership variables with exposure remains robust. Table 7 The impact of ownership structure on exchange rate exposure with hedging proxies
Conclusion
This study provides the following contributions to the existing literature. Firstly, this study draws from the literature of hedging theories and corporate governance, and suggests that ownership structure as a firm-level internal governance mechanism may explain some of the ambiguity in the existing empirical literature. To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to provide evidence that ownership structure, in which agency costs and monitoring problems are lower, is associated with a reduced level of exchange rate exposure. Secondly, this study explains why currency derivative usage is ineffective for some firms by providing evidence that the use of currency derivatives is associated with greater reduction in exchange exposure for firms that have lower agency and monitoring problems derived from their ownership structure compared with other firms. This study has important implications for managers, shareholders and other investors who are associated with assessing a firm's exposure to exchange rate risk. This paper's findings underline the importance of taking into account the ownership structure in resolving the existing exposure puzzle (Bartram and Bodnar, 2007) , and suggest that corporate governance may explain why hedging is ineffective for some firms. Furthermore, this study has important implications for how investors should assess firms' exposure to exchange rate risk, and suggests that the quality of internal corporate governance helps them infer that currency derivative usage is done for optimal hedging reasons, thereby yielding a significant reduction in exchange rate exposure. These findings can be extended to other emerging markets, where ownership structure serves as a major internal governance mechanism in the absence of external governance mechanisms. Future research might consider other measures of firm-level internal corporate governance, such as compensation structures for managers.
